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This
 paper
 reports
 the
 results
 of
 a
 series
 of
 competitive
 labour
 market
 experiments
 in
 which
subjects
  have
  the
  possibility
  to
  reciprocate
  favours.
  In
  the
  high
  stake
  condition
  subjects
earned
  between
  two
  and
  three
  times
  their
  monthly
  income
  during
  the
  experiment.
  In
  the
normal
  stake
  condition
  the
  stake
  level
  was
  reduced
  by
  a
  factor
  of
  ten.
  We
  observe
  that
  both
in
 the
 high
 and
 the
 normal
 stake
 condition
 fairness
 concerns
 are
 strong
 enough
 to
 outweigh
competitive
  forces
  and
  give
  rise
  to
  non-competitive
  wages.
  There
  is
  also
  no
  evidence
  that
effort
 behaviour
 becomes
 generally
 more
 selﬁsh
 at
 higher
 stake
 levels.
 Therefore,
 our
 results
suggest
  that
  fairness
  concerns
  may
  play
  an
  important
  role
  even
  at
  relatively
  high
  stake
levels.
© 2013 Published by Elsevier B.V.
1.
  Introduction 22
During
 the
 last
 decades
 economists
 and
 psychologists
 have
 gathered
 much
 evidence
 suggesting
 that
 concerns
 for
 fairness 23
and
  reciprocity
  cannot
  be
  ignored
  in
  social
  interactions.
  This
  evidence
  and
  applications
  of
  recently
  developed
  theories 24
of
  social
  preferences
  indicate
  that
  fairness
  concerns
  may
  help
  solving
  problems
  that
  have
  puzzled
  economists
  for
  a
  long 25
time
  like,
  e.g.
  the
  persistence
  of
  non-competitive
  wage
  premia
  (Agell
  and
  Lundborg,
  1995,
  2007;
  Bewley,
  1999;
  Campbell
  Q5 26
and
  Kamlani,
  1997),
  the
  possibility
  of
  involuntary
  unemployment
  (Fehr
  et
  al.,
  1993;
  MacLeod
  and
  Malcomson,
  1998),
  the 27
incompleteness
  of
  contracts
  (Fehr
  et
  al.,
  2007),
  the
  allocation
  of
  property
  rights
  (Ellingsen
  and
  Johannesson,
  2004,
  2005; 28
Sonnemans
  et
  al.,
  2001),
  the
  conditions
  for
  successful
  collective
  action
  (Ostrom,
  2000)
  and
  the
  design
  of
  contracts
  (Fehr
  and 29
Falk,
  2002;
  Englmaier
  and
  Wambach,
  2010). 30
Since
 a
 considerable
 part
 of
 the
 evidence
 for
 the
 relevance
 of
 fairness
 concerns
 comes
 from
 questionnaire
 studies
 and
 from 31
laboratory
 experiments
 sceptics
 sometimes
 dismissed
 this
 evidence
 by
 claiming
 that
 in
 real
 life
 the
 stakes
 involved
 are
 much 32
higher
 than
 in
 laboratory
 experiments.
 Intuitively,
 it
 seems
 compelling
 to
 assume
 that
 fairness
 concerns
 become
 less
 relevant 33
when
  the
  stakes
  are
  high.
  In
  addition,
  it
  has
  been
  frequently
  pointed
  out
  that
  in
  competitive
  environments
  deviations
  from 34
 This
  paper
  reports
  the
  results
  of
  experiments
  conducted
  in
  spring
  1994
  in
  Moscow,
  Russia.
  The
  paper
  has
  beneﬁted
  from
  presentations
  in
  seminars
  at
Berkeley,
  Harvard,
  Pittsburgh,
  Princeton
  and
  Tucson.
  We
  thank
  the
  participants
  of
  these
  seminars
  for
  helpful
  comments.
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rationality
  and
  self-interest
  are
  likely
  to
  be
  less
  important.1 Thus,
  perhaps
  the
  interaction
  between
  competitive
  markets
  and 35
high
  stakes
  will
  render
  fairness
  concerns
  unimportant.
  Since
  we
  believe
  that
  these
  arguments
  should
  be
  taken
  seriously
  we 36
conducted
  a
  series
  of
  competitive
  labour
  market
  experiments
  in
  which
  subjects
  have
  the
  possibility
  to
  reciprocate
  favours. 37
To
  study
  the
  impact
  of
  variations
  in
  stake
  size
  we
  implemented
  a
  high
  stake
  condition,
  in
  which
  the
  subjects
  earned
  on 38
average
  between
  two
  and
  three
  times
  their
  monthly
  incomes,
  and
  a
  normal
  stake
  condition,
  in
  which
  the
  subjects’
  income 39
opportunities
  were
  reduced
  by
  a
  factor
  of
  ten.
  To
  be
  able
  to
  ﬁnance
  these
  experiments
  we
  have
  conducted
  them
  in
  Moscow 40
(Russia).
  Both
  in
  the
  high
  and
  the
  normal
  stake
  condition
  subjects
  participated
  in
  a
  so-called
  gift
  exchange
  experiment.
  In 41
this
  experiment
  wage
  formation
  took
  place
  in
  a
  competitive
  experimental
  market
  and
  after
  a
  labour
  contract
  was
  concluded 42
workers
  chose
  the
  effort
  level.
  Fairness
  concerns
  can,
  in
  principle,
  play
  a
  role
  in
  this
  environment
  because
  experimental 43
workers
  can
  reciprocate
  to
  high
  wage
  offers
  with
  high
  effort
  levels.
  The
  experiment
  is
  designed
  such
  that
  selﬁsh
  workers 44
will
 never
 make
 reciprocal
 effort
 choices.
 Yet,
 if
 there
 are
 sufﬁciently
 many
 fair
 workers
 exhibiting
 reciprocal
 effort
 behaviour, 45
paying
  high,
  non-competitive,
  wages
  may
  be
  proﬁtable
  for
  the
  experimental
  employers. 46
In
 contrast
 to
 common
 intuitions
 and
 beliefs
 the
 ten-fold
 increase
 in
 stake
 size
 has
 little
 impact
 on
 behaviour.
 We
 observe 47
no
 differences
 in
 wages
 at
 the
 different
 stake
 levels.
 Both
 in
 the
 high
 and
 the
 normal
 stake
 condition
 experimental
 employers 48
pay
  a
  substantial
  non-competitive
  premium.
  Wages
  typically
  are
  three
  times
  higher
  than
  the
  wage
  that
  is
  predicted
  by
  the 49
competitive
  model
  (based
  on
  the
  assumption
  of
  selﬁsh
  subjects).
  Moreover,
  the
  increase
  in
  stake
  size
  also
  has
  little
  impact 50
on
  workers’
  effort
  behaviour.
  On
  average,
  workers
  in
  both
  stake
  conditions
  exhibit
  reciprocal
  effort
  choices
  that
  made
  it 51
proﬁtable
  for
  the
  employers
  to
  pay
  non-competitive
  wages.
  There
  are
  small
  treatment
  differences
  in
  effort
  levels
  but
  the 52
sign
 of
 these
 differences
 varies
 with
 the
 wage
 level.
 At
 relatively
 low
 wages
 effort
 is
 slightly
 higher
 in
 the
 high
 stake
 condition 53
whereas
  at
  relatively
  high
  wages
  the
  reverse
  holds
  true.
  At
  intermediate
  wage
  levels
  the
  effort
  is
  the
  same
  across
  conditions. 54
We
  believe
  that
  these
  ﬁndings
  are
  of
  interest
  for
  labour
  economists
  and
  people
  who
  are
  interested
  in
  the
  potential
  sources 55
of
  involuntary
  unemployment
  and
  non-competitive
  wage
  premia
  because
  the
  gift
  exchange
  experiment
  captures
  the
  spirit 56
of
  the
  fairness
  version
  of
  efﬁciency
  wage
  theory
  (Akerlof,
  1982;
  Akerlof
  and
  Yellen,
  1990). 57
To
  examine
  potential
  peculiarities
  of
  our
  Russian
  subject
  pool
  we
  also
  conducted
  two
  further
  control
  experiments
  in 58
the
  normal
  stake
  condition.
  In
  one
  control
  treatment
  we
  ﬁxed
  the
  workers’
  effort
  exogenously
  so
  that
  ﬁrms
  had
  no
  reason 59
to
  worry
  about
  effort.
  In
  this
  condition
  the
  experimental
  employers
  did
  not
  shy
  away
  from
  paying
  very
  unfair
  wages
  that 60
are
  close
  to
  the
  competitive
  level.2 Thus,
  whereas
  variations
  in
  stake
  size
  have
  no
  impact
  on
  wage
  formation
  institutional 61
differences
  across
  markets,
  that
  is,
  whether
  effort
  is
  enforced
  exogenously,
  lead
  to
  radically
  different
  wage
  outcomes.
  In 62
a
  second
  control
  experiment
  we
  observed
  the
  behaviour
  of
  Austrian
  subjects
  in
  the
  gift
  exchange
  condition.
  It
  turns
  out 63
that
  wages
  as
  well
  as
  effort
  does
  not
  differ
  across
  the
  Russian
  and
  the
  Austrian
  subject
  pool.
  This
  suggests
  that
  there
  is 64
nothing
  special
  about
  our
  Russian
  subjects,
  which
  strengthens
  our
  conﬁdence
  in
  the
  potential
  generalisability
  of
  our
  high 65
stake
  results
  across
  subject
  pools. 66
There
  are
  some
  other
  papers
  that
  examined
  how
  a
  rise
  in
  stake
  size
  affects
  the
  role
  of
  fairness
  concerns
  in
  the
  ultimatum 67
game.3 It
  is
  well
  known
  that
  the
  subgame
  perfect
  equilibrium
  in
  this
  game
  involves
  a
  strong
  earnings
  inequality
  if
  both 68
players
  are
  selﬁsh
  and
  rational.
  There
  exists
  by
  now
  a
  large
  body
  of
  experimental
  evidence,
  which
  contradicts
  this
  extreme 69
prediction
  (e.g.
  Güth
  and
  Tietz,
  1990;
  Roth,
  1995;
  Camerer
  and
  Thaler,
  1995).
  Typically,
  most
  proposers
  in
  the
  ultimatum 70
game
  offer
  between
  40
  and
  50
  percent
  of
  the
  available
  money
  to
  the
  other
  party
  and
  responders
  reject
  low
  offers
  with
  high 71
probability.
  Hoffmann,
  McCabe
  and
  Smith
  (HMS,
  1996)
  reported
  the
  results
  of
  ultimatum
  games
  with
  relatively
  high
  stakes. 72
HMS
 varied
 the
 stakes
 from
 $10
 to
 $100.
 Their
 subjects
 were
 students
 at
 the
 University
 of
 Arizona.
 HMS
 show
 that
 the
 increase 73
in
  stakes
  does
  not
  affect
  the
  proposers’
  offers.
  They
  provide
  informal
  evidence
  that
  responder
  rejection
  rates
  decreased
  with 74
stake
  size.
  Yet,
  this
  claim
  is
  difﬁcult
  to
  evaluate
  because
  they
  did
  not
  provide
  a
  statistical
  analysis
  of
  responders’
  rejection 75
behaviour
  that
  controlled
  for
  the
  offers
  being
  received
  by
  the
  responders.
  Cameron
  (1999)
  examined
  the
  impact
  of
  very
  high 76
stakes.
 In
 her
 experiments
 subjects
 could
 earn
 three
 months’
 income
 in
 a
 one-shot
 high
 stake
 ultimatum
 game.
 In
 the
 normal 77
stake
  condition
  the
  amount
  to
  be
  divided
  up
  between
  the
  bargainers
  is
  twenty
  times
  lower.
  She
  reports
  that
  the
  proposers’ 78
behaviour
 is
 not
 affected
 by
 this
 large
 variation
 in
 stake
 size
 whereas
 the
 responders’
 rejection
 rates
 are
 a
 bit
 lower
 in
 the
 high 79
stake
  condition.
  Slonim
  and
  Roth
  (1998)
  observe
  a
  similar
  result
  although
  with
  a
  different
  twist.
  They
  repeat
  the
  ultimatum 80
game
  ten
  times
  with
  different
  opponents.
  They
  observe
  that
  stake
  size
  variations
  do
  not
  affect
  the
  proposers’
  behaviour. 81
During
  the
  early
  rounds
  of
  the
  game
  they
  also
  do
  not
  ﬁnd
  a
  stake
  size
  effect
  for
  the
  responders.
  However,
  towards
  the
  end
  of 82
1 ¨ Claims
  about
  the
  irrelevance
  of
  models
  of
  rational
  choice
  and
  the
  consequent
  irrelevance
  of
  economics
  are
  not
  uncommon
  topics
  of
  conversation.
  ...
If
  one
  looks
  at
  experimental
  markets
  for
  evidence,
  the
  pessimism
  is
  not
  justiﬁed.
  Market
  models
  based
  on
  rational
  choice
  principles
  do
  a
  pretty
  good
  job
of
  capturing
  the
  essence
  of
  very
  complicated
  phenomena¨ (Plott,
  1986,
  p.
  141).
  Smith
  (1991,
  p.
  881)
  writes
  that
  markets ¨ reinforce,
  even
  induce
  individual
rationality”.
  Such
  claims
  are
  based
  on
  the
  remarkable
  tendency
  of
  competitive
  experimental
  markets
  (with
  no
  or
  little
  reciprocation
  opportunities)
  to
converge
  to
  the
  competitive
  prediction
  that
  is
  derived
  from
  assumptions
  of
  full
  rationality
  and
  self-interest.
2 It
  is
  sometimes
  argued
  that
  “fair”
  behaviour
  is
  driven
  by
  the
  fact
  that
  experimenters
  can
  observe
  subjects’
  actions,
  i.e.
  that
  subjects
  do
  not
  want
  to
appear
  greedy
  to
  the
  experimenter.
  However,
  experimental
  employers
  had
  little
  problems
  with
  appearing
  greedy
  in
  the
  condition
  with
  exogenous
  effort
because
  they
  paid
  very
  low
  (unfair)
  wages.
  Thus,
  if
  subjects
  are
  concerned
  about
  appearing
  greedy,
  this
  concern
  seems
  to
  be
  easily
  overruled
  by
  other
concerns.
3 The
 ultimatum
 game
 is
 a
 bilateral
 bargaining
 game
 in
 which
 two
 players
 have
 to
 agree
 how
 to
 split
 a
 certain
 amount
 of
 money
 according
 to
 the
 following
rules.
  The
  proposer
  makes
  one
  proposal
  of
  how
  to
  split
  the
  money.
  The
  responder
  can
  accept
  or
  reject
  this
  proposal.
  If
  she
  rejects
  both
  players
  get
  zero
payoff.
  If
  she
  accepts
  the
  proposal
  is
  implemented.Please
  cite
  this
  article
  in
  press
  as:
  Fehr,
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the
  experiment
  the
  responders
  exhibit
  a
  slightly
  higher
  willingness
  to
  accept
  low
  offers.
  The
  strongest
  effect
  of
  stake
  size
  in 83
the
  ultimatum
  game
  has
  been
  observed
  by
  Andersen
  et
  al.
  (2011)
  who
  paid
  their
  subjects
  up
  to
  roughly
  one
  year’s
  salary
  or 84
the
  equivalent
  of
  roughly
  1600
  working
  hours.
  They
  ﬁnd
  that
  at
  their
  highest
  stake
  level
  responder’s
  rejection
  rates
  are
  very 85
low
  although
  they
  were
  still
  sizeable
  when
  the
  stake
  size
  was
  equivalent
  to
  160
  working
  hours.
  Stake
  size
  effects
  have
  found 86
to
  be
  insigniﬁcant
  in
  Carpenter
  et
  al.
  (2005)
  as
  well
  as
  Kocher
  et
  al.
  (2008).
  Diekmann
  (2004)
  summarises
  the
  literature
  on 87
high
  stakes
  experiment
  up
  to
  that
  time
  and
  concludes
  “that
  altruistic
  reciprocity
  remains
  robust
  if
  stakes
  are
  high”
  (page 88
502).
  Johansson-Stenman
  et
  al.
  (2005)
  ﬁnd
  lower
  trust
  and
  trustworthiness
  for
  higher
  stakes
  condition,
  but
  also
  in
  the
  high 89
stake
  condition
  trust
  and
  trustworthiness
  are
  remarkably
  high.
  Cooperative
  behaviour
  under
  very
  high
  stakes
  has
  also
  been 90
studied
  –
  and
  found
  –
  in
  game
  shows
  where
  stakes
  reach
  thousands
  of
  dollars
  (List,
  2006;
  Oberholzer-Gee
  et
  al.,
  2010;
  van 91
den
  Assem
  et
  al.,
  2012).
  Recently,
  Karagözo˘ glu
  and
  Urhan
  (2013)
  have
  compiled
  a
  comprehensive
  overview
  of
  stake
  size
  Q6 92
effect
  experiments
  and
  come
  to
  the
  conclusion
  that
  “the
  experiments
  in
  this
  ﬁeld
  do
  not
  lead
  to
  clear/common
  results”.4 93
Our
  study
  examines
  the
  role
  of
  fairness
  concerns
  in
  the
  context
  of
  a
  competitive
  experimental
  market.
  In
  the
  absence 94
of
  opportunities
  for
  reciprocation
  these
  markets
  have
  shown
  a
  remarkable
  tendency
  to
  converge
  towards
  the
  competitive 95
prediction
  (Smith,
  1982;
  Plott,
  1989).
  This
  allows
  us
  to
  study
  whether
  the
  combination
  of
  competition
  and
  high
  stakes
  does 96
diminish
  the
  role
  of
  fairness.
  Yet,
  as
  our
  results
  show,
  this
  is
  not
  the
  case. 97
Despite
  the
  different
  institutional
  set-up
  between
  our
  study
  and
  the
  research
  on
  stake
  size
  variations
  in
  the
  ultimatum 98
game
  there
  are
  some
  common
  ﬁndings
  that
  deserve
  to
  be
  emphasised.5 First,
  all
  studies
  report
  that
  an
  increase
  in
  stake
  size 99
does
  not
  affect
  the
  decisions
  of
  the
  ﬁrst-movers
  in
  the
  sequentially
  played
  game.
  Second,
  to
  the
  extent
  to
  which
  stake
  size 100
variations
  do
  affect
  the
  behaviour
  of
  second
  movers,
  the
  effects
  are
  remarkably
  small
  despite
  large
  –
  ten-
  or
  twenty-fold
  – 101
increases
  in
  stake
  size.
  There
  is,
  in
  particular,
  no
  indication
  that
  fairness
  concerns
  play
  no
  longer
  a
  role
  if
  the
  stake
  size
  is 102
increased
  up
  to
  three
  months’
  income. 103
The
  remainder
  of
  this
  paper
  is
  organised
  in
  three
  sections.
  In
  Section
  2
  the
  experimental
  design
  is
  presented
  in
  some 104
detail.
  Section
  3
  examines
  the
  data
  and
  Section
  4
  summarises
  our
  results. 105
2.
  Experimental
  design 106
Since
  we
  are
  interested
  in
  the
  question
  whether,
  and
  to
  what
  extent,
  competitive
  markets
  with
  high
  monetary
  stakes 107
reduce
  the
  role
  of
  reciprocal
  fairness
  our
  design
  has
  to
  have
  at
  least
  the
  following
  three
  features:
  (i)
  It
  should
  allow
  for
  the 108
possibility
  of
  reciprocal
  fairness,
  that
  is,
  reciprocity
  should
  not
  be
  ruled
  out
  by
  the
  design.
  (ii)
  The
  trading
  institution
  should 109
be
  a
  competitive
  experimental
  market
  and
  (iii)
  we
  need
  a
  high
  and
  a
  normal
  stake
  condition.
  The
  ﬁrst
  two
  of
  these
  features 110
are
  present
  in
  the
  so-called
  Gift-Exchange
  Market
  (Fehr
  et
  al.,
  1993).6 Several
  experiments
  with
  Gift
  Exchange
  Markets 111
(GEMs)
  indicate
  that
  fairness
  considerations
  have
  a
  substantial
  effect
  on
  subjects’
  wage
  and
  effort
  choices
  and
  give
  rise
  to 112
stable
  non-competitive
  outcomes.7 The
  main
  purpose
  of
  this
  paper
  is
  to
  compare
  subjects’
  behaviour
  in
  a
  Gift
  Exchange 113
Market
  under
  normal
  and
  high
  stakes.
  Since
  the
  GEM
  constitutes
  the
  basic
  element
  of
  our
  experimental
  design
  we
  will
  next 114
describe
  its
  features
  in
  more
  detail.
  Then
  we
  will
  describe
  an
  important
  control
  experiment,
  which
  we
  call
  the
  complete 115
contracts
  markets
  (CCM). 116
2.1.
  The
  Gift
  Exchange
  Market
  (GEM) 117
The
  GEM
  is
  an
  experimental
  labour
  market
  in
  which
  ﬁrms
  act
  as
  wage
  setters
  while
  workers
  have
  to
  determine
  their 118
effort
  after
  they
  have
  accepted
  a
  wage
  offer.8 The
  GEM-design
  has
  two
  stages:
  At
  the
  ﬁrst
  stage
  wages
  w
  are
  determined
  in
  a 119
competitive
  one-sided
  oral
  auction
  in
  which
  each
  ﬁrm
  can
  publicly
  make
  wage
  proposals
  to
  a
  group
  of
  workers.
  Workers
  can 120
accept
  these
  offers
  but
  they
  cannot
  make
  counteroffers.
  At
  the
  second
  stage
  those
  workers
  who
  have
  accepted
  a
  wage
  offer 121
have
  to
  choose
  an
  effort
  level
  e
 ∈
 {0.1,
 0.2,
 .
 .
 .,
 1}.
  Both
  stages
  together
  constitute
  a
  period
  and,
  in
  general,
  there
  are
  several 122
periods
  with
  identical
  experimental
  parameters.
  This
  stationary
  repetition
  allows
  subjects
  to
  become
  acquainted
  with
  the 123
trading
  institution.
  In
  addition,
  it
  enables
  us
  to
  study
  the
  potential
  convergence
  properties
  of
  the
  GEM. 124
Notice,
  that
  in
  a
  one-sided
  oral
  auction
  ﬁrms
  cannot
  make
  an
  offer
  to
  a
  speciﬁc
  worker.
  Any
  worker
  can
  accept
  the
  offer 125
and,
  once
  it
  is
  accepted,
  a
  labour
  contract
  is
  concluded.
  The
  auction
  stage
  has
  a
  pre-announced
  time
  limit.
  In
  our
  case
  the 126
limit
  was
  three
  minutes.
  Within
  this
  time
  limit
  ﬁrms
  are
  free
  to
  revise
  their
  wage
  offers.
  The
  revision
  of
  offers
  has
  to
  obey
  the 127
4 This
  echos
  the
  conclusion
  of
  Camerer
  and
  Hogarth
  (1999)
  who
  provide
  a
  general
  review
  of
  stake
  size
  effects
  in
  economic
  experiments.
  These
  authors
conclude
  that
  the
  modal
  effect
  of
  higher
  stakes
  is
  to
  leave
  mean
  behaviour
  unaffected
  but
  they
  reduce
  the
  variance
  of
  subject’s
  behaviour.
5 A
 very
 important
 qualiﬁcation
 of
 this
 generalisation
 concerns
 the
 case
 of
 zero
 stakes.
 Cameron
 (1999)
 also
 conducted
 ultimatum
 games
 with
 hypothetical
stakes.
  In
  these
  games
  proposer
  behaviour
  was
  very
  different
  compared
  to
  games
  were
  some
  real
  money
  was
  at
  stake.
  In
  particular,
  proposers
  made
  much
lower
  offers
  in
  the
  hypothetical
  stake
  condition.
  Thus,
  our
  generalisation
  only
  applies
  to
  situations
  in
  which
  some
  money
  is
  at
  stake.
6 Akerlof
  (1982)
  interpreted
  labour
  contracts
  as
  a
  partial
  gift
  exchange.
  Our
  choice
  of
  labels
  for
  the
  major
  treatment
  conditions
  is
  based
  on
  Akerlof’s
notion
  of
  gift
  exchange.
7 Charness
  (2000),
  Hannan
  et
  al.
  (2002),
  Fehr
  et
  al.
  (1998)
  and
  Brandts
  and
  Charness
  (2004).
8 We
  present
  the
  English
  translation
  of
  our
  GEM-instructions
  in
  the
  ****Appendix.Please
  cite
  this
  article
  in
  press
  as:
  Fehr,
  E.,
  et
  al.,
  Do
  high
  stakes
  and
  competition
  undermine
  fair
  behaviour?
  Evidence
from
  Russia.
  J.
  Econ.
  Behav.
  Organ.
  (2013),
  http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2013.09.005
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so-called
  improvement
  rule,
  which
  is
  common
  to
  many
  different
  types
  of
  auctions.
  The
  improvement
  rule
  stipulates
  that, 128
in
  a
  given
  period,
  any
  new
  wage
  offer
  has
  to
  be
  higher
  than
  the
  highest
  offer,
  which
  has
  not
  yet
  been
  accepted
  by
  a
  worker.9 129
An
 essential
 feature
 of
 the
 GEM
 is
 that
 the
 labour
 contract
 does
 not
 stipulate
 the
 effort
 level.
 There
 is
 an
 exogenously
 given 130
level
  of
  effort
  eo,
  which
  can
  be
  enforced
  by
  ﬁrms.
  Any
  e
 >
 eo is,
  however,
  not
  enforceable
  by
  means
  of
  economic
  incentives. 131
This
 feature
 of
 the
 GEM
 is
 based
 on
 a
 view
 of
 the
 employment
 relation
 as
 a
 contractually
 incompletely
 regulated
 relationship. 132
The
  view
  that
  labour
  contracts
  are
  rather
  incomplete
  and
  that
  imperfect
  enforcement
  technologies
  exclude
  the
  attainment 133
of
  certain
  effort
  levels
  is
  by
  now
  widely
  recognised.10 134
In
  our
  GEMs
  each
  ﬁrm
  can
  employ
  at
  most
  one
  worker
  and
  each
  worker
  can
  accept
  at
  most
  one
  wage
  offer
  in
  a
  given 135
period.
  Once
  those
  workers
  who
  accepted
  a
  wage
  offer
  have
  chosen
  an
  effort
  level
  the
  period
  is
  over
  and
  a
  new
  one
  begins. 136
In
  total,
  each
  GEM-session
  has
  10
  periods.
  Firms’
  payoff
  function
  in
  experimental
  currency
  (Guilders)
  is
  given
  by 137
˘
  =
  (v −
  w)e,
  (1) 138
where
  v
  is
  an
  exogenously
  given
  redemption
  value.
  Workers’
  payoff
  function
  in
  experimental
  money
  (Guilders)
  is
  given
  by 139
U
  =
  w
  −
  c(e)
  −
  co.
  (2) 140
c(e)
  represents
  the
  effort
  cost
  function
  and
  obeys
  the
  conditions
  c(eo)
 =
 0
  and
  c  >
 0.
  co denotes
  an
  exogenously
  given
  level
  of 141
ﬁxed
  costs
  of
  working.
  In
  case
  that
  a
  subject
  does
  not
  trade
  his
  or
  her
  payoff
  is
  zero. 142
The
  payoffs
  in
  experimental
  money
  are
  transformed
  into
  real
  money
  payoffs
  at
  the
  end
  of
  the
  experiment.
  The
  exchange 143
rate
  between
  experimental
  money
  and
  real
  money
  is
  the
  same
  for
  both
  workers
  and
  ﬁrms
  and
  it
  is
  common
  knowledge. 144
To
  exclude
  the
  possibility
  of
  losses
  wage
  offers
  above
  v
  and
  below
  co are
  not
  allowed.
  The
  choice
  of
  payoff
  function
  (1) 145
is
  also
  guided
  by
  the
  attempt
  to
  avoid
  losses.
  It
  is
  by
  now
  well
  known
  that
  behaviour
  may
  be
  affected
  by
  loss
  aversion.11 146
Since
  we
  want
  to
  rule
  out
  that
  the
  impact
  of
  reciprocal
  fairness
  is
  “polluted”
  by
  loss
  aversion
  phenomena
  we
  implemented 147
payoff
  function
  (1)
  instead
  of
  the
  more
  familiar
  function
  ˘
  =
 ve
 −
 w.
  As
  will
  be
  shown
  below,
  under
  the
  usual
  assumption 148
of
  rational
  money
  maximising
  agents,
  our
  choice
  of
  the
  payoff
  function
  would
  neither
  qualitatively
  nor
  quantitatively
  affect 149
the
  behaviour
  of
  experimental
  subjects. 150
2.2.
  Treatment
  conditions 151
The
  main
  purpose
  of
  this
  paper
  is
  to
  compare
  the
  behaviour
  of
  our
  Russian
  subjects
  under
  high
  and
  normal
  stakes 152
GEMs.
  However,
  to
  rule
  out
  that
  potential
  peculiarities
  of
  Russian
  subjects
  are
  responsible
  for
  our
  results
  we
  perform
  two 153
checks.
  First,
  we
  compare
  the
  behaviour
  of
  the
  Russian
  subjects
  with
  the
  behaviour
  of
  Austrian
  subjects
  under
  conditions 154
of
  a
  normal
  stake
  GEM.
  More
  speciﬁcally,
  we
  compare
  the
  results
  of
  our
  normal
  stake
  GEM
  experiments
  with
  the
  GEM- 155
experiments
  conducted
  by
  Fehr
  et
  al.
  (1998).12 Second,
  we
  run
  a
  so-called
  Complete
  Contracts
  Market
  (CCM)
  experiment 156
with
  the
  Russian
  subjects
  in
  the
  normal
  stake
  condition.
  A
  CCM
  is
  similar
  to
  a
  GEM
  except
  that
  there
  are
  no
  possibilities 157
for
  reciprocation
  because
  the
  effort
  level
  is
  exogenously
  ﬁxed.
  Therefore,
  all
  phenomena
  in
  the
  GEM,
  which
  are
  due
  to
  the 158
possibility
  of
  reciprocal
  effort
  choices
  should
  not
  be
  observed
  in
  the
  CCM.
  In
  Fehr
  et
  al.
  (1998)
  it
  has
  been
  shown
  that,
  in
  the 159
case
  of
  an
  exogenously
  ﬁxed
  effort
  level,
  non-competitive
  wages
  tend
  to
  vanish
  over
  time.
  It
  would
  thus
  be
  reassuring
  if
  the 160
same
  happens
  among
  the
  Russian
  subjects.
  Our
  CCM
  also
  lasts
  for
  ten
  periods
  and
  wages
  are
  determined
  in
  a
  one-sided
  oral 161
auction.
  As
  in
  the
  GEM
  a
  worker
  can
  accept
  at
  most
  one
  offer
  per
  period
  and
  a
  ﬁrm
  can
  employ
  at
  most
  one
  worker. 162
Contrary
 to
 the
 GEM
 there
 is
 no
 effort
 stage
 in
 the
 CCM.
 e
 is
 set
 exogenously
 equal
 to
 one
 and
 no
 effort
 costs
 are
 subtracted 163
from
  a
  worker’s
  wage.13 In
  the
  CCM
  the
  payoff
  in
  terms
  of
  experimental
  money
  from
  a
  labour
  contract
  are,
  therefore,
  given 164
by 165
˘
  =
  v
  −
  w
  (1’) 166
U
  =
  w
  −
  co (2’) 167
9 Notice,
  that
  this
  rule
  does
  not
  rule
  out
  underbidding.
  Assume
  that
  the
  best
  wage
  offer
  is,
  for
  example,
  60
  while
  the
  second
  best
  offer
  is
  50.
  A
  ﬁrm
  who
wants
  to
  bid
  only
  51,
  has
  to
  wait
  until
  60
  is
  accepted.
  Then
  it
  can
  offer
  51.
10 In
  the
  textbook
  of
  Milgrom and
  Roberts
  (1992)
  we
  ﬁnd,
  for
  example,
  the
  following
  paragraph
  (p.
  329): ¨ The
  employment
  contract
  is
  typically
  quite
imprecise.
  The
  employees
  agree
  that
  –
  within
  limits
  that
  are
  rarely
  completely
  described
  and
  only
  partly
  understood
  –
  they
  will
  use
  their
  minds
  and
muscles
  to
  undertake
  the
  tasks
  that
  the
  employer
  directs
  them
  to
  do,
  perhaps
  using
  the
  methods
  that
  the
  employer
  speciﬁes.
  The
  employer
  agrees
  to
  pay
the
  employees.
  The
  range
  of
  actions
  that
  might
  be
  requested
  or
  required
  is
  unclear.
  Future
  compensation
  and
  even
  the
  criteria
  used
  to
  determine
  future
pay
  and
  promotions
  are
  unspeciﬁed.
  The
  mechanism
  to
  be
  used
  in
  case
  of
  dispute
  is
  not
  stated,
  nor
  are
  the
  penalties
  for
  most
  possible
  violations
  of
  the
contract.¨
11 For
  a
  summary
  see
  Tversky
  and
  Kahneman
  (1991).
12 For
  the
  purpose
  of
  this
  comparison
  our
  Russian
  instructions
  constitute
  a
  translation
  of
  the
  instructions
  used
  by
  Fehr
  et
  al.
  (1998).
  We
  applied
  the
method
  of
  back
  translation.
  First,
  the
  instructions
  were
  translated
  from
  German
  into
  Russian.
  Then,
  a
  different
  person
  translated
  them
  back
  into
  German.
If
  the
  back
  translation
  indicated
  a
  deviation
  from
  the
  original
  instructions
  the
  two
  translators
  together
  with
  a
  third
  translator
  and
  an
  experimenter
  had
  to
clarify
  the
  issue.
  The
  experiments
  in
  Russia
  and
  Austria
  are
  based
  on
  the
  same
  parameters
  and
  information
  conditions.
  To
  control
  for
  experimenter
  effects
both
  E.
  Tougareva
  and
  E.
  Fehr
  were
  present
  during
  the
  experiments
  in
  Austria
  and
  in
  Russia.
13 In
  this
  respect
  the
  payoff
  is
  not
  the
  same
  as
  the
  payoff
  in
  the
  GEM
  with
  the
  highest
  possible
  effort.Please
  cite
  this
  article
  in
  press
  as:
  Fehr,
  E.,
  et
  al.,
  Do
  high
  stakes
  and
  competition
  undermine
  fair
  behaviour?
  Evidence
from
  Russia.
  J.
  Econ.
  Behav.
  Organ.
  (2013),
  http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2013.09.005
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Table
  1
Effort
  cost schedule.
Effort 0.1
  0.2
  0.3
  0.4
  0.5
  0.6
  0.7
  0.8
  0.9
  1
Cost
  0
  1
  2
  4
  6
  8
  10
  12
  15
  18
All
  other
  aspects
  of
  the
  CCM
  are
  identical
  to
  the
  GEM. 168
2.3.
  Information
  conditions 169
In
  the
  GEM
  as
  well
  as
  in
  the
  CCM
  the
  parameters
  v,
  co,
  c(e),
  the
  number
  of
  workers
  L,
  the
  number
  of
  ﬁrms
  N,
  the
  fact
  that 170
there
  were
  ten
  periods
  and
  the
  exchange
  rate
  between
  experimental
  money
  and
  real
  money
  are
  common
  knowledge.
  At 171
the
  beginning
  of
  each
  session
  a
  random
  mechanism
  determines
  whether
  a
  subject
  is
  a
  ﬁrm
  or
  a
  worker.
  Before
  the
  start
  of 172
a
  ten-period
  session
  a
  trial
  period
  is
  conducted
  in
  which
  no
  money
  is
  at
  stake.
  Before
  this
  trial
  period
  subjects
  have
  to
  solve 173
several
  exercises
  in
  which
  they
  have
  to
  compute
  their
  own
  money
  payoffs
  as
  well
  as
  the
  money
  payoffs
  of
  their
  trading 174
partner
  from
  hypothetical
  trades. 175
Neither
  in
  the
  GEM
  nor
  in
  the
  CCM
  the
  subjects
  know
  the
  identity
  of
  their
  trading
  partner.
  To
  ensure
  this
  anonymity 176
condition
  ﬁrms
  and
  workers
  are
  located
  in
  different
  rooms
  and
  the
  communication
  between
  these
  rooms
  takes
  place
  by 177
means
  of
  a
  telephone.
  Because
  of
  the
  anonymity
  of
  trades
  no
  ﬁrm
  can
  signal
  workers
  that
  it
  is
  a
  high
  or
  a
  low
  wage
  ﬁrm.
  Nor 178
can
  workers
  develop
  a
  reputation
  as
  high
  or
  low
  effort
  workers.
  It
  is
  also
  not
  possible
  that
  subjects
  punish
  or
  reward
  past 179
actions
  of
  their
  current
  trading
  partners
  because
  they
  do
  not
  know
  the
  identity
  or
  the
  past
  actions
  of
  their
  trading
  partners. 180
All
  wage
  offers
  are
  public
  information.
  They
  are
  written
  on
  a
  blackboard
  in
  both
  rooms.
  As
  soon
  as
  a
  particular
  wage
  offer 181
is
  accepted
  it
  is
  deleted
  from
  the
  blackboard.
  In
  addition,
  all
  other
  offers
  of
  the
  trading
  ﬁrm
  are
  also
  deleted
  because
  they
  are 182
no
  longer
  available.
  Effort
  levels
  in
  the
  GEM
  are
  only
  known
  to
  the
  ﬁrm-worker
  pair
  who
  participates
  in
  a
  trade.
  In
  the
  GEM 183
a
  worker
  does
  not
  know
  the
  effort
  levels
  of
  other
  workers.
  The
  reason
  for
  this
  is
  that
  we
  want
  to
  rule
  out
  group-pressure 184
effects.
  These
  information
  conditions
  ensure
  that
  subjects
  can
  compute
  their
  own
  payoffs
  and
  the
  payoffs
  of
  their
  trading 185
partners. 186
2.4.
  Parameters
  and
  competitive
  predictions 187
In
  all
  GEMs
  and
  CCMs
  we
  set
  v
 =
 120
  and
  co =
 20.
  The
  effort
  cost
  schedule
  in
  the
  GEMs
  is
  given
  by
  Table
  1. 188
In
  the
  GEM
  as
  well
  as
  in
  the
  CCM
  there
  are
  always
  9
  workers
  and
  6
  ﬁrms.
  Due
  to
  this
  excess
  supply
  of
  workers
  the 189
competitive
  wage
  for
  the
  CCM
  is
  given
  by
  wc =
 co =
 20,
  in
  case
  that
  subjects
  exhibit
  exclusively
  selﬁsh
  preferences.
  The 190
competitive
  wage
  for
  the
  GEM
  is
  the
  same:
  For
  any
  given
  wage
  offer
  a
  rational
  money
  maximising
  worker
  will
  always 191
choose
  the
  lowest
  effort
  because
  any
  other
  level
  would
  lower
  U.
  Since
  at
  e
 =
 0.1
  workers’
  reservation
  wages
  are
  given
  by 192
co =
 20
  wages
  in
  the
  GEM
  and
  the
  CCM
  should
  not
  differ
  according
  to
  the
  competitive
  prediction. 193
2.5.
  Testing
  for
  the
  effects
  of
  high
  monetary
  stakes 194
To
  study
  the
  effects
  of
  high
  monetary
  stakes
  we
  have
  conducted
  eight
  GEMs
  in
  Moscow.
  In
  four
  of
  these
  GEMs,
  denoted 195
by
  s1–s4,
  the
  exchange
  rate
  between
  experimental
  Guilders
  and
  real
  money
  generated
  an
  income,
  which
  was
  comparable 196
to
  the
  income
  earned
  by
  Austrian
  subjects
  in
  the
  GEM-experiments
  of
  Fehr
  et
  al.
  (1998).
  In
  the
  other
  four
  GEMs,
  which
  we 197
denote
  by
  S1–S4,
  the
  exchange
  rate
  was
  increased
  by
  a
  factor
  of
  ten,
  i.e.
  subjects’
  income
  opportunities
  in
  the
  “high
  stake” 198
GEMs
  are
  ten
  times
  higher. 199
We
  paid
  subjects
  in
  US
  Dollars.
  In
  the
  normal
  stake-GEM
  they
  received
  2
  US-cents
  per
  unit
  of
  experimental
  currency 200
(Guilders)
  while
  in
  the
  high
  stake-GEM
  they
  received
  20
  cents.
  To
  increase
  the
  awareness
  of
  the
  exchange
  rate
  between 201
Guilders
  and
  Dollars
  the
  exchange
  rate
  was
  noted
  at
  the
  top
  of
  each
  decision
  sheet.
  In
  our
  GEMs
  the
  maximum
  gains
  per 202
trade
  were
  100
  Guilders.
  Therefore,
  the
  maximum
  gains
  in
  terms
  of
  US-Dollars
  amount
  to
  $20.
  The
  median
  subject
  in
  our 203
subject
  pool
  had
  a
  monetary
  income
  per
  month
  of
  slightly
  less
  than
  $17.14 64
  percent
  had
  a
  monetary
  monthly
  income
  of 204
less
  than
  $20.
  On
  average,
  subjects
  earned
  between
  $40
  and
  $50
  in
  a
  high
  stake
  GEM-session.
  It
  is,
  thus
  fair
  to
  say
  that
  about 205
two
  thirds
  of
  our
  subjects
  earned
  between
  2
  and
  3
  times
  their
  monetary
  monthly
  incomes
  in
  a
  two
  hour
  GEM-session
  with 206
high
  stakes.
  The
  experiments
  were
  conducted
  between
  March
  and
  May
  1994.
  Four
  sessions
  (s1,
  s2,
  S1,
  S2)
  were
  organised 207
in
  March,
  the
  other
  four
  (s3,
  s4,
  S3,
  S4)
  in
  May
  1994. 208
The
  monthly(!)
  Roubel
  inﬂation
  during
  the
  ﬁrst
  half
  of
  1994
  varied
  between
  9
  and
  22
  percent.
  As
  a
  consequence,
  the 209
Dollar
  became
  a
  major
  store
  of
  value
  and
  a
  signiﬁcant
  part
  of
  everyday
  transactions
  took
  place
  in
  Dollars.
  Due
  to
  the
  high 210
14 We
  elicited
  information
  about
  subjects’
  income
  by
  a
  questionnaire
  before
  the
  starts
  of
  the
  ﬁrst
  trading
  round.
  Subjects
  were
  asked
  to
  write
  down
  what
they
  earn
  on
  average
  per
  month
  in
  each
  of
  the
  following
  income
  categories:
  (i)
  monthly
  student
  grant,
  (ii)
  salary
  in
  case
  of
  a
  permanent
  job,
  (iii)
  average
income
  of
  occasional
  jobs,
  (iv)
  average
  income
  they
  get
  from
  parents
  or
  relatives,
  (v)
  income
  from
  other
  sources.
  They
  were
  asked
  to
  reveal
  their
  incomes
truthfully.
  In
  order
  to
  give
  them
  an
  incentive
  for
  truthful
  revelation
  the
  questionnaire
  did
  not
  contain
  their
  names
  or
  their
  subject
  numbers.
  They
  ﬁlled
  out
the
  questionnaire
  privately,
  put
  it
  into
  an
  unmarked
  envelope
  and
  threw
  it
  into
  a ¨ voting¨ box.Please
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Fig.
  1.
  The
  impact
  of
  stake
  size
  on
  average
  wages.
Roubel
  inﬂation
  households
  tended
  to
  convert
  the
  money,
  which
  they
  did
  not
  need
  for
  immediate
  consumption
  purposes,
  as 211
soon
  as
  possible
  into
  Dollars.15 Thus,
  knowledge
  of
  the
  Dollar-Roubel
  exchange
  rate
  was
  vital
  in
  these
  circumstances.
  Since 212
virtually
  everybody
  could
  be
  expected
  to
  know
  the
  Roubel-Dollar
  exchange
  rate
  under
  these
  circumstances
  we
  considered 213
the
  dangers
  of
  money
  illusion
  to
  be
  negligible
  if
  we
  paid
  subjects
  in
  Dollars.16 Taken
  together,
  it
  is
  reasonable
  to
  assume
  that 214
subjects
  in
  the
  high
  stake
  GEMs
  considered
  the
  potentially
  achievable
  gains
  per
  trade
  as
  a
  very
  large
  amount
  of
  money.17 215
The
  comparison
  of
  outcomes
  between
  s1–s4
  on
  the
  one
  hand
  and
  S1–S4
  on
  the
  other
  hand
  allows
  an
  investigation
  of 216
the
  effects
  of
  a
  rise
  in
  stakes.
  In
  case
  that
  we
  observe
  in
  both
  treatments
  a
  signiﬁcant
  and
  similar
  amount
  of
  reciprocally 217
fair
  behaviour
  the
  question
  arises
  whether
  this
  is
  due
  to
  a
  general
  inclination
  of
  Russian
  subjects
  to
  be
  fair
  or
  whether
  it
  is 218
due
  to
  the
  possibility
  of
  reciprocal
  effort
  choices
  in
  the
  GEM.
  To
  discriminate
  between
  these
  hypotheses
  we
  organised
  four 219
CCMs
  with
  normal
  stakes.
  The
  exchange
  rate
  between
  Guilders
  and
  real
  money
  in
  these
  CCMs
  was
  l
  Guilder
 =
 4/3
  Cents.
  This 220
exchange
  rate
  provides
  subjects
  in
  the
  CCMs
  on
  average
  with
  the
  same
  overall
  income
  as
  in
  the
  normal
  stake
  GEMs.
  The 221
same
  subjects
  who
  participated
  ﬁrst
  in
  the
  normal
  stake
  GEMs
  were
  present
  in
  the
  CCMs,
  that
  is,
  the
  normal
  stake
  GEM
  and 222
the
  CCM
  were
  part
  of
  the
  same
  overall
  session.
  The
  GEM
  always
  took
  place
  ﬁrst
  and
  subjects
  did
  not
  know
  that
  after
  the 223
GEM
  a
  CCM-experiment
  will
  take
  place.
  Moreover,
  subjects
  in
  the
  CCMs
  were
  in
  the
  same
  role
  as
  in
  the
  normal-stake-GEMs. 224
3.
  Results 225
In
  total
  120
  subjects
  participated
  in
  our
  Russian
  sessions.
  60
  subjects
  were
  present
  in
  the
  GEMs
  and
  CCMs
  of
  the
  normal 226
stake
  sessions
  (s1–s4)
  and
  60
  subjects
  participated
  in
  our
  high
  stake
  -GEMs
  S1–S4.
  All
  our
  subjects
  were
  ﬁrst
  and
  second 227
year
  undergraduates
  from
  a
  college,
  which
  provides
  mainly
  education
  for
  engineers.
  On
  average,
  a
  GEM
  lasted
  1.5–2
 hours 228
while
  a
  CCM
  lasted
  approximately
  45
 minutes.
  The
  number
  of
  potential
  trades
  in
  each
  GEM
  as
  well
  as
  in
  each
  CCM
  is
  60. 229
Therefore,
  the
  total
  number
  of
  GEM-trades
  (CCM-trades)
  is
  480
  (240).
  The
  actual
  number
  of
  trades
  in
  the
  GEMs
  was
  479 230
while
  in
  the
  CCMs
  it
  was
  238.
  Our
  ﬁrst
  main
  result
  deals
  with
  wage
  differences
  across
  the
  different
  treatments. 231
Result
  1.
  The
  wage
  is
  not
  affected
  by
  stake
  size.
  In
  contrast,
  the
  possibility
  of
  reciprocal
  effort
  choices
  in
  the
  gift
  exchange 232
market
  has
  a
  large
  impact
  on
  wage
  levels. 233
A
  ﬁrst
  indication
  for
  Result
  1
  is
  provided
  in
  Fig.
  1,
  which
  shows
  the
  time
  pattern
  of
  average
  wages
  across
  treatment 234
conditions
  for
  the
  Russian
  subjects.
  The
  ﬁgure
  shows
  that
  in
  all
  periods
  the
  average
  wage
  in
  the
  high
  and
  normal
  stake
  GEMs 235
is
  very
  similar.
  This
  contrasts
  sharply
  with
  the
  level
  and
  the
  time
  pattern
  of
  wages
  in
  the
  CCMs.
  Already
  in
  period
  1
  there 236
is
  a
  large
  difference
  in
  wages
  across
  GEMs
  and
  CCMs.
  In
  addition,
  whereas
  wages
  in
  the
  CCMs
  slowly
  but
  steadily
  converge 237
towards
  the
  competitive
  level
  of
  20,
  wages
  in
  the
  GEMs
  even
  increase
  over
  time.
  Overall,
  in
  the
  CCMs
  86
  percent
  of
  all
  wages 238
are
  below
  40
  whereas
  in
  the
  GEMs
  roughly
  75
  percent
  of
  all
  wages
  are
  above
  50.
  Fig.
  1
  makes
  it
  already
  transparent
  that 239
15 These
  exchange
  needs
  caused
  the
  existence
  of
  a
  large
  number
  of
  exchange
  ofﬁces.
  Banks
  made
  many
  advertisements
  for
  Dollar
  accounts
  and
  TV-News
announced
  the
  exchange
  rate
  several
  times
  a
  day.
16 We
  controlled
  for
  this
  kind
  of
  money
  illusion
  by
  asking
  subjects
  to
  compute
  the
  Roubel
  value
  of
  their
  dollar
  earnings
  at
  the
  end
  of
  the
  experiment.
Many
  of
  them
  asked
  us
  which
  exchange
  rate
  they
  should
  take,
  those
  for
  buying
  Roubels
  or
  those
  for
  selling
  Roubels.
  There
  was
  no
  subject,
  which
  failed
  to
do
  this
  exercise
  correctly.
17 This
  view
  is
  further
  corroborated
  by
  a
  comparison
  of
  the
  monthly
  incomes
  of
  our
  experimental
  assistants,
  who
  where
  30
  years
  old
  adults
  with
  regular
jobs
  at
  the
  Russian
  Academy
  of
  Sciences,
  with
  the
  experimental
  incomes
  of
  our
  subjects.
  Whereas
  subjects
  earned
  between
  $40
  and
  $50
  in
  a
  two-hour
session
  our
  experimental
  assistants
  had
  a
  monthly
  income
  of
  roughly
  $30
  and
  even
  this
  low
  income
  had
  not
  been
  paid
  to
  them
  for
  several
  previous
  months.Please
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Fig.
  2.
  The
  impact
  of
  stake
  size
  on
  effort
  choices.
the
  institutional
  differences
  between
  the
  GEM
  and
  the
  CCM
  are
  much
  more
  important
  for
  wage
  formation
  than
  the
  stake 240
differences
  across
  the
  GEM-treatments. 241
Result
  1
  is
  also
  supported
  by
  formal
  statistical
  tests.
  A
  non-parametric
  Mann
  Whitney
  test
  with
  the
  average
  wage
  per 242
session
  as
  the
  unit
  of
  observation
  indicates
  that
  the
  null
  hypothesis
  of
  equal
  wages
  across
  stake
  sizes
  cannot
  be
  rejected
  for 243
the
  GEMs
  (p
 =
 0.56).
  A
  regression
  of
  individual
  wages
  in
  the
  GEMs
  on
  a
  constant
  and
  a
  high
  stake
  dummy
  yields
  the
  same 244
result.
  The
  high
  stake
  dummy
  has
  a
  coefﬁcient
  of
  −.07
  and
  a
  t-statistic
  of
  −.01
  (p
 =
 .991).18 Thus,
  as
  suggested
  by
  Fig.
  1,
  stake 245
size
  does
  not
  affect
  wage
  levels
  in
  the
  GEMs.
  In
  contrast
  to
  this,
  the
  wage
  difference
  across
  GEMs
  and
  CCMs
  is
  signiﬁcant. 246
The
  null
  hypothesis
  of
  equal
  wages
  across
  high
  stake
  GEMs
  and
  CCMs
  can
  be
  rejected
  (Mann
  Whitney
  test,
  average
  wage 247
per
  session
  as
  unit
  of
  observation,
  p
 =
 0.021). 248
Previous
  Gift
  Exchange
  experiments
  (e.g.
  Fehr
  et
  al.,
  1998)
  have
  shown
  that
  the
  workers’
  reciprocal
  effort
  behaviour
  is 249
the
  driving
  force
  behind
  non-competitive
  wages
  because
  workers’
  reciprocity
  makes
  it
  proﬁtable
  for
  the
  ﬁrms
  to
  pay
  non- 250
competitive
  wage
  premia.
  Therefore,
  the
  fact
  that
  wages
  are
  similar
  across
  stake
  conditions
  suggests
  that
  effort
  behaviour 251
is
  also
  similar.
  Our
  next
  result
  sheds
  more
  light
  on
  this
  issue. 252
Result
  2.
  At
  low
  wages
  effort
  is
  higher
  in
  the
  high
  stake
  condition
  whereas
  at
  high
  wages
  effort
  is
  higher
  in
  the
  normal 253
stake
  condition.
  The
  differences
  across
  stake
  conditions
  are,
  however,
  small
  and,
  often,
  insigniﬁcant. 254
Support
  for
  Result
  2
  comes
  from
  Fig.
  2
  and
  Table
  2.
  Fig.
  2
  shows
  how
  the
  average
  effort
  varies
  across
  different
  wage 255
intervals.
 The
 ﬁgure
 indicates
 that
 in
 the
 wage
 intervals
 [35,49]
 and
 [50,64]
 effort
 is
 slightly
 higher
 in
 the
 high
 stake
 condition 256
whereas
  for
  wages
  above
  64
  the
  reverse
  holds
  true.
  For
  wages
  at
  about
  60
  effort
  levels
  are
  the
  same
  across
  conditions.
  For 257
each
  of
  the
  wage
  intervals
  in
  Fig.
  2
  we
  have
  conducted
  Mann
  Whitney
  tests
  of
  the
  null
  hypothesis
  of
  equal
  effort
  levels
  across 258
stake
  conditions.
  It
  turns
  out
  that
  only
  in
  the
  interval
  [35,49]
  effort
  levels
  are
  signiﬁcantly
  different
  (p
 =
 .04). 259
To
  further
  explore
  differences
  in
  effort
  choices
  we
  ran
  several
  OLS
  and
  ordered
  probit
  regressions
  (see
  Table
  2).
  In
  all 260
regressions
  displayed
  in
  Table
  2
  we
  computed
  robust
  standard
  errors
  that
  allow
  for
  dependent
  within-session
  observations. 261
This
  procedure
  is
  necessary
  because
  the
  observations
  within
  a
  given
  session
  cannot
  be
  assumed
  to
  be
  uncorrelated.
  The
  OLS 262
regression
  1
  in
  Table
  2
  relates
  individual
  effort
  on
  a
  constant,
  the
  worker’s
  wage,
  a
  high-stake
  dummy
  and
  an
  interaction 263
term
  between
  the
  wage
  and
  the
  high-stake
  dummy.
  The
  coefﬁcient
  on
  wages
  is
  highly
  signiﬁcant
  and
  positive
  indicating
  a 264
positive
  effort-wage
  relation
  in
  the
  normal
  stake
  condition.
  The
  high-stake
  dummy
  is
  also
  signiﬁcantly
  positive
  suggesting 265
that
  at
  lower
  wage
  levels
  subjects
  provide
  more
  effort
  in
  the
  high
  stake
  condition.
  The
  interaction
  term
  between
  wages
  and 266
high
  stakes
  is
  signiﬁcantly
  negative.
  The
  results
  of
  regression
  1
  imply
  that
  for
  wages
  sufﬁciently
  above
  60
  the
  effort
  tends 267
to
  be
  higher
  in
  the
  normal
  stake
  condition. 268
To
 check
 the
 robustness
 of
 this
 conclusion
 we
 also
 ran
 ordered
 probit
 regressions.
 The
 probit
 regression
 takes
 into
 account 269
that
  the
  effort
  could
  not
  be
  chosen
  continuously
  and
  cannot
  be
  lower
  than
  0.1
  and
  higher
  than
  1.19 Regression
  2
  shows
  that 270
the
  qualitative
  results
  described
  above
  remain
  unchanged.
  The
  inclusion
  of
  a
  quadratic
  wage
  term
  in
  regressions
  3
  and
  4
  also 271
does
 not
 change
 our
 conclusions.
 The
 quadratic
 term
 is
 negative
 and,
 in
 equation
 4,
 signiﬁcant
 indicating
 that
 the
 effort-wage 272
relations
  is
  concave.
  Yet,
  the
  results
  of
  regressions
  3
  and
  4
  also
  imply
  that
  at
  lower
  wages
  effort
  is
  higher
  in
  the
  high-stake 273
condition
  whereas
  at
  wages
  above
  60
  effort
  is
  higher
  in
  the
  normal
  stake
  condition. 274
In
  their
  paper
  on
  high
  stake
  ultimatum
  games
  Slonim
  and
  Roth
  (1998)
  ﬁnd
  an
  interaction
  effect
  between
  experience
  and 275
the
  stake
  level.
  During
  the
  ﬁnal
  periods
  of
  the
  “repeated”
  ultimatum
  game
  subjects’
  propensity
  to
  reject
  low
  offers
  is
  slightly 276
18 This
  t-statistic
  is
  based
  on
  robust
  standard
  errors
  taking
  into
  account
  the
  possibility
  that
  within-session
  wage
  observations
  may
  be
  dependent.
  Only
across-session
  wage
  observations
  are
  treated
  as
  independent
  variables.
19 We
  also
  ran
  interval
  regressions.
  They
  yield
  the
  same
  qualitative
  results
  as
  the
  OLS
  and
  the
  ordered
  probit
  regressions.Please
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Table
  2
The
  impact of stake
  size
  on
  effort
  levels.
(1)
OLS
(2)
Ordered
  Probit
(3)
OLS
(4)
Ordered
  Probit
(5)
OLS
(6)
Ordered
  Probit
Constant −0.211*** −0.338* −0.195***
(0.059)
  (0.157)
  (0.052)
Wage 0.009*** 0.051*** 0.014** 0.124*** 0.010*** 0.056***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.032) (0.001) (0.003)
High
  stake 0.259*** 1.573*** 0.218** 1.096*** 0.232*** 1.470***
Dummy
  (0.073)
  (0.295)
  (0.081)
  (0.240)
  (0.061)
  (0.248)
High
  stake
 ×
 wage −0.005** −0.027*** −0.004* −0.017*** −0.006** −0.033***
(0.001)
  (0.005)
  (0.002)
  (0.005)
  (0.002)
  (0.006)
Wage2 −0.000
  −0.001**
(0.000)
  (0.000)
Period −0.012* −0.067***
(0.005)
  (0.020)
High
  stake
 ×
 period 0.015
  0.083**
(0.009)
  (0.041)
Last
  period
  0.014
  0.101
Dummy
  (0.028)
  (0.120)
High
  stake
 ×
 last
  period 0.014
  0.026
(0.039)
  (0.180)
(pseudo)
  R2 0.207
  0.0556
  0.211
  0.0626
  0.219
  0.0594
N 479
  479
  479
  479
  479
  479
#
  Clusters
  8
  8
  8
  8
  8
  8
Note:
  The
  table
  is
  based
  on
  data
  from
  the
  normal
  stake
  and
  high
  stake
  Russian
  Gift
  Exchange
  Experiments.
  Robust
  standard
  errors,
  clustering
  on
  sessions,
are
  in
  parentheses.
*** Signiﬁcance
  at
  the
  1
  percent
  level.
** Signiﬁcance
  at
  the
  5
  percent
  level.
* Signiﬁcance
  at
  the
  10
  percent
  level.
lower
  in
  the
  high
  stake
  condition.20 This
  raises
  the
  question
  whether
  subjects
  are
  less
  willing
  to
  provide
  non-minimal
  effort 277
levels
  in
  the
  ﬁnal
  periods
  of
  our
  GEMs.
  To
  examine
  this
  question
  we
  have
  added
  a
  period
  variable
  and
  a
  last
  period
  dummy 278
to
  regressions
  1
  and
  2.
  In
  addition,
  we
  interacted
  these
  variables
  with
  the
  high
  stake
  dummy.
  The
  results
  of
  these
  regressions 279
are
  displayed
  in
  equations
  5
  and
  6
  of
  Table
  2.
  The
  table
  shows
  that
  the
  period
  coefﬁcient
  is
  signiﬁcantly
  negative.
  However, 280
the
  interaction
  with
  the
  high
  stake
  dummy
  is
  positive
  and
  larger
  than
  the
  period
  coefﬁcient.
  In
  the
  ordered
  probit
  regression 281
it
  is
  even
  signiﬁcantly
  positive.
  Thus
  subjects
  behave
  more
  selﬁshly
  over
  the
  course
  of
  the
  experiment,
  but
  only
  in
  the
  low 282
stake
  treatment.
  Apart
  from
  the
  time
  trend,
  there
  is
  no
  signiﬁcant
  end
  game
  effect,
  which
  is
  reﬂected
  in
  the
  insigniﬁcant 283
coefﬁcient
  of
  the
  last
  period
  dummy.
  Thus,
  the
  effect
  of
  high
  stakes
  is
  the
  opposite
  of
  what
  one
  might
  expect
  in
  view
  of
  the 284
results
  in
  Slonim
  and
  Roth
  (1998)
  because
  they
  eliminates
  the
  negative
  time
  trend.
  In
  comparison
  with
  the
  normal
  stake 285
condition
  effort
  is
  higher
  in
  the
  high
  stakes
  condition
  towards
  the
  end
  of
  the
  experiment. 286
Result
  1
  and
  Result
  2
  suggest
  that
  high
  stakes
  cause
  no
  differences
  in
  wage
  setting
  and
  only
  small
  differences
  in
  effort 287
behaviour.
 This
 raises
 the
 question
 to
 what
 extent
 our
 results
 can
 be
 generalised
 beyond
 the
 Russian
 context.
 A
 fully
 convinc- 288
ing
  answer
  to
  this
  question
  can
  of
  course
  only
  be
  given
  if
  one
  conducts
  the
  same
  experiments
  outside
  of
  Russia.
  However, 289
if
  it
  were
  possible
  to
  show
  that
  –
  in
  the
  normal
  stake
  condition
  –
  Russian
  subjects
  behave
  similar
  to
  Non-Russian
  subjects 290
there
  would
  be
  little
  reason
  to
  believe
  that
  in
  the
  high
  stake
  condition
  cross-national
  differences
  would
  show
  up.
  Therefore, 291
we
  next
  turn
  to
  this
  question. 292
Result
  3.
  There
  is
  no
  difference
  in
  wages
  and
  effort
  levels
  across
  the
  Austrian
  and
  Russian
  gift
  exchange
  markets
  with 293
normal
  stakes. 294
Support
  for
  Result
  3
  is
  provided
  in
  Figs.
  1
  and
  3
  and
  in
  Table
  3.
  Fig.
  1
  shows
  that
  the
  level
  and
  the
  time
  pattern
  of
  wages 295
are
  very
  similar
  across
  Austrian
  and
  Russian
  GEMs.
  Sometimes
  wages
  in
  Austria
  are
  a
  bit
  higher,
  sometimes
  they
  are
  higher 296
in
  Russia.
  Towards
  the
  end
  of
  the
  experiment
  wages
  are,
  in
  fact,
  very
  close
  to
  each
  other.
  This
  picture
  is
  also
  supported
  by 297
statistical
  test.
  A
  Mann
  Whitney
  test,
  with
  session
  averages
  as
  the
  unit
  of
  observation,
  indicates
  no
  signiﬁcant
  differences 298
(p
 =
 1.0)
  and
  if
  we
  regress
  individual
  wages
  on
  a
  constant
  and
  a
  dummy
  for
  Austria,
  the
  coefﬁcient
  of
  the
  dummy
  variable
  is 299
small
  (0.07)
  and
  highly
  insigniﬁcant
  (p
 =
 0.984). 300
With
  regard
  to
  effort
  behaviour
  a
  similar
  picture
  emerges.
  Fig.
  3
  shows
  that
  at
  some
  wage
  intervals
  effort
  is
  slightly 301
higher
  in
  Austria
  but
  these
  differences
  are
  not
  even
  close
  to
  signiﬁcant.
  In
  Table
  3
  we
  report
  our
  regression
  results
  for 302
the
  normal
  stake
  GEM-sessions
  in
  Austria
  and
  Russia.
  Whereas
  the
  constant
  and
  the
  wage
  slope
  coefﬁcient
  are
  highly 303
signiﬁcant
  the
  dummy
  variable
  for
  Austria
  as
  well
  as
  the
  interaction
  between
  the
  Austria-dummy
  and
  the
  wage
  are 304
20 In
  Slonim
  and
  Roth
  subjects
  meet
  a
  new
  partner
  in
  every
  period.
  Thus,
  each
  ultimatum
  game
  is
  one-shot
  but
  they
  can
  still
  study
  the
  role
  of
  experience
because
  subjects
  meet
  10
  different
  opponents.Please
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Fig.
  3.
  Effort
  choices in
  Russian
  and
  Austrian
  normal stake sessions.
Table
  3
Effort
  Behaviour
  in
  gift
  exchange
  markets
  with
  normal
  stakes
  in
  Austria
  and
  Russia.
(1)
OLS
(2)
Ordered
  Probit
Constant −0.211***
(0.059)
Wage 0.009*** 0.052***
(0.001)
  (0.005)
Austria
  dummy 0.082
  0.626
(0.095)
  (0.559)
Austria
 ×
 wage −0.001
  −0.006
(0.002)
  (0.009)
R2 0.249 0.0731
N
  500
  500
#
  Clusters 8
  8
Note:
  The
  table
  is
  based
  on
  data
  from
  the
  normal
  stake
  and
  high
  stake
  Russian
  Gift
  Exchange
  Experiments.
  Robust
  standard
  errors,
  clustering
  on
  sessions,
are
  in
  parentheses.
*** Signiﬁcance
  at
  the
  1
  percent
  level.
**,
  *
  denote
  signiﬁcance
  at
  the
  5
  and
  10
  percent
  level,
  respectively.
insigniﬁcant
  –
  exhibiting
  in
  all
  cases
  a
  standard
  error
  that
  exceeds
  the
  value
  of
  the
  coefﬁcient.
  Thus,
  taken
  together
  these 305
data
  suggest
  that
  with
  regard
  to
  wages
  and
  effort
  there
  are
  no
  signiﬁcant
  cross-national
  differences
  in
  the
  normal
  stake 306
GEMs. 307
4.
  Summary 308
Common
  intuitions
  about
  the
  relevance
  of
  fairness
  motives
  seem
  to
  suggest
  that
  these
  motives
  are
  less
  important
  in 309
competitive
 environments
 and
 in
 environments
 where
 large
 amounts
 of
 money
 are
 at
 stake.
 We
 have
 examined
 this
 question 310
by
  conducting
  gift
  exchange
  experiments
  in
  a
  competitive
  environment
  under
  normal
  and
  under
  high
  stakes.
  In
  the
  high 311
stake
  condition
  the
  stake
  level
  was
  ten
  times
  higher
  than
  in
  the
  normal
  stake
  condition
  enabling
  subjects
  to
  earn
  between 312
two
  and
  three
  times
  their
  monthly
  incomes
  in
  a
  two
  hour
  experiment.
  Despite
  this
  strong
  increase
  in
  the
  stake
  level
  wages 313
in
  the
  gift
  exchange
  condition
  are
  indistinguishable
  across
  stake
  levels
  –
  exhibiting
  a
  substantial
  non-competitive
  wage 314
premium.
  In
  sharp
  contrast
  to
  the
  high
  non-competitive
  wages
  in
  the
  gift
  exchange
  condition
  wages
  converge
  close
  to 315
competitive
  levels
  when
  workers’
  effort
  is
  exogenously
  ﬁxed.
  This
  indicates
  that
  the
  institutional
  differences
  between
  the 316
gift
  exchange
  market
  and
  the
  complete
  contracts
  market
  are
  much
  more
  important
  than
  differences
  in
  stake
  levels. 317
In
  the
  domain
  of
  effort
  behaviour
  stake
  levels
  seem
  to
  have
  a
  small
  impact.
  For
  wages
  up
  to
  about
  60,
  effort
  tends
  to 318
be
  slightly
  higher
  in
  the
  high
  stake
  condition
  while
  for
  wages
  above
  60
  they
  are
  somewhat
  lower.
  These
  differences
  are 319
however
  very
  small
  and,
  apparently,
  did
  not
  affect
  wage
  setting
  behaviour.
  Moreover,
  the
  combination
  of
  high
  stakes
  and 320
experience
  does
  also
  not
  induce
  experimental
  workers’
  to
  make
  more
  greedy
  effort
  choices.
  If
  anything,
  effort
  is
  higher
  in 321
the
  high
  stake
  condition
  towards
  the
  end
  of
  the
  experiment.
  One
  might
  wonder
  whether
  our
  results
  depend
  on
  the
  speciﬁc 322
parameters
  of
  the
  game.
  Of
  course,
  this
  cannot
  be
  excluded.
  Nevertheless,
  Dittrich
  and
  Ziegelmeyer
  (2006)
  studied
  different 323
variants
  of
  the
  gift
  exchange
  game.
  They
  ﬁnd
  that
  wages
  strongly
  depend
  on
  the
  parameters
  while
  the
  effort-wage
  relation 324
is
  robust. 325
Our
  results
  and
  the
  results
  of
  Cameron
  (1999)
  suggest
  that
  up
  to
  roughly
  three
  months’
  income
  the
  strength
  of
  fairness 326
motives
  exhibits
  little
  response
  to
  stake
  levels.
  Thus,
  doubts
  about
  the
  external
  validity
  of
  fair
  behaviour
  in
  laboratory 327
experiments
  that
  are
  based
  on
  the
  argument
  that
  the
  stake
  level
  in
  the
  experiment
  is
  not
  sufﬁciently
  high
  are
  not
  supported 328Please
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by
  the
  data
  –
  at
  least
  up
  to
  stake
  levels
  of
  three
  months
  income.
  We
  can,
  of
  course,
  not
  rule
  out
  that
  for
  stake
  levels
  beyond 329
three
  months’
  income
  stake
  size
  has
  a
  bigger
  behavioural
  impact.
  However,
  if
  one
  judges
  the
  relevance
  of
  our
  results
  one 330
should
  ask
  oneself,
  how
  many
  daily
  choices
  involve
  more
  than
  three
  months’
  income.
  We
  are
  quite
  conﬁdent
  that
  for
  most 331
people
  most
  of
  their
  choices
  involve
  a
  substantially
  lower
  amount
  of
  resources.
  If
  one
  accepts
  this
  claim
  there
  is
  little
  basis 332
for
  questioning
  the
  relevance
  of
  fairness
  motives
  for
  reasons
  of
  insufﬁcient
  stake
  size
  for
  the
  bulk
  of
  people’s
  choices. 333
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Appendix
  A.
  Supplementary
  data 336
Supplementary
  data
  associated
  with
  this
  article
  can
  be
  found,
  in
  the
  online
  version,
  at 337
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2013.09.005. 338
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